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ABSTRACT 
From failures of intelligence analysis to misguided beliefs about vaccinations, biased  
judgment and decision making contributes to problems in policy, business, medicine, 
law, and private life. Early attempts to reduce decision biases with training met with little 
success, leading scientists and policy makers to focus on debiasing by using incentives 
and changes in the presentation and elicitation of decisions. We report the results of two 
longitudinal experiments that found medium to large effects of one-shot debiasing 
training interventions. Participants received a single training intervention, played a 
computer game or watched an instructional video, which addressed biases critical to 
intelligence analysis (in Experiment 1: bias blind spot, confirmation bias, and 
fundamental attribution error; in Experiment 2: anchoring, representativeness, and social 
projection). Both kinds of interventions produced medium to large debiasing effects 
immediately (games ≥ -31.94% and videos ≥ -18.60%) that persisted at least 2 months 
later (games ≥ -23.57% and videos ≥ -19.20%). Games, which provided personalized 
feedback and practice, produced larger effects than did videos. Debiasing effects were 
domain-general: bias reduction occurred across problems in different contexts, and 
problem formats that were taught and not taught in the interventions. The results suggest 
that a single training intervention can improve decision making. We suggest its use 
alongside improved incentives, information presentation, and nudges to reduce costly 
errors associated with biased judgments and decisions.    
 
Tweet: A single training intervention with an instructional game or video produced large 
and persistent reductions in decision bias. 





• Biases in judgment and decision making create predictable errors in domains such 
as intelligence analysis, policy, law, medicine, business, and private life 
 
• Debiasing interventions can be effective, inexpensive methods to improve 
decision making and reduce the costly errors that decision biases produce 
 
• We found a short, single training intervention (i.e., playing a computer game or 
watching a video) produced persistent reductions in six cognitive biases critical to 
intelligence analysis 
 
• Training appears to be an effective debiasing intervention to add to existing 
interventions such as improvements in incentives, information presentation, and 






Debiasing Decisions 4 
“Indeed, it appears that in some instances analysts’ presumptions were so firm that they simply 
disregarded evidence that did not support their hypotheses. As we saw in several instances, when 
confronted with evidence that indicated Iraq did not have WMD, analysts tended to discount such 
information. Rather than weighing the evidence independently, analysts accepted information that 
fit the prevailing theory and rejected information that contradicted it. While analysts must adopt 
some frame of reference to interpret the flood of data they see, their baseline assumptions must be 
flexible enough to permit revision by discordant information. The analysts’ frame of reference on 
Iraq’s WMD programs—formed as it was by Iraq’s previous use of such weapons, Iraq’s 
continued efforts to conceal its activities, and Iraq’s past success at hiding such programs—was 
so strong, however, that contradictory data was often discounted as likely false.” 
- Report to the President of the United States (Silberman et al., 2005, p. 169) 
 
Biased judgment and decision making is that which systematically deviates from 
the prescriptions of objective standards such as facts, rational behavior, statistics, or logic 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Decision bias is not unique to intelligence analysis. It 
affects the intuitions and calculated decisions of novices and highly trained experts in 
numerous domains including business, medicine, and law (Morewedge & Kahneman, 
2010; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) underlying phenomena such as the tendency to 
sell winning stocks too quickly and hold on to losing stocks too long (Shefrin & Statman, 
1985), the persistent belief in falsified evidence linking vaccinations to autism 
(Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012), and unintentional 
discrimination in hiring and promotion practices (Krieger & Fiske, 2006). Biased 
judgment and decision making affects people in their private lives. Less biased decision 
makers have more intact social environments, reduced risk of alcohol and drug use, lower 
childhood delinquency rates, and superior planning and problem solving abilities (Parker 
& Fischhoff, 2005).  
Decision making ability varies across persons and within person across the 
lifespan (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; Dhami, Schlottmann, & 
Waldmann, 2011; Peters & Bruine de Bruin, 2011), but people are generally unaware of 
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the extent to which they are biased and have difficulty debiasing their decision making 
(Scopelliti, Morewedge, McCormick, Min, LeBrecht, & Kassam, 2015; Wilson & 
Brekke, 1994). Considerable scientific effort has been expended developing strategies 
and methods to improve novice and expert decision making over the last 50 years (for 
reviews, see Fischhoff, 1982; Soll Milkman, & Payne, in press). Three general debiasing 
approaches have been attempted, each with its pros and cons: changing incentives, 
optimizing choice architecture (e.g., improving how decisions are presented and elicited), 
and improving decision making ability through training.    
 
INCENTIVES 
 Changing incentives can substantially improve decision making. Recalibrating 
incentives to reward healthy behavior improves diet (Schwartz, Mochon, Wyper, Maroba, 
Patel, & Ariely, 2014), exercise (Charness & Gneezy, 2009), weight loss (John et al., 
2011), medication adherence (Volpp et al., 2008), and smoking cessation (Volpp et al., 
2009). In one study, during a period in which the price of fresh fruit was reduced by 50% 
in suburban and urban school cafeterias, sales of fresh fruit increased four-fold (French, 
2003). Incentives are not a solution for every bias, bias is prevalent even in high-stake 
multibillion-dollar decisions (Arkes & Blumer, 1985).  
Incentives can also backfire. When incentives erode intrinsic motivation and 
change norms from prosociality to economic exchange, incentives demotivate behavior if 
they are insufficient or discontinued (Gneezy Meier, & Rey-Biel, 2011). Israeli daycare 
facilities that introduced a small fine when parents picked up their children late, for 
instance, saw an increase in the frequency of late pickups. The fine made rude behavior 
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acceptable, a price to watch the children a little longer (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). 
When incentives are too great, they can make people choke under pressure (Ariely, 
Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar, 2009). If people apply inappropriate decision strategies 
or correction methods because they do not know how or the extent to which they are 
biased, increasing incentives can exacerbate bias rather than mitigate it (Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999). In short, incentives can effectively improve behavior, but they require 
careful calibration and implementation. 
 
OPTIMIZING CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 
Optimizing the structure of decisions, how choice options are presented and how 
choices are elicited, is a second way to effectively debias decisions. People do make 
better decisions when they have the information they need and good options to choose 
from. Giving people more information and choices is not always helpful, particularly 
when it makes decisions too complex to comprehend, existing biases encourage good 
behavior, or people recognize the choices they need to make but fail to implement them 
because they lack self-control (Bhargava & Loewenstein, 2015; Fox & Sitkin, 2015). 
Providing calorie information does not necessarily lead people to make healthier food 
choices, for instance, and there is some evidence that smokers actually overestimate the 
health risks of smoking—debiasing smokers may actually increase their health risks 
(Downs, Loewenstein, & Wisdom, 2009).  
Changing what and how information is presented can make choices easier to 
understand and good options easier to identify, thus doing more to improve decisions 
than simply providing more information. Eligible taxpayers are more likely to claim their 
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Earned Income Tax Credits, for example, when benefit information is simplified and 
prominently displayed (e.g., “…of up to $5,657”; Bhargava & Manoli, in press). 
Consumers are better able to recognize that small reductions in the fuel consumption of 
inefficient vehicles saves more fuel than large reductions in the fuel consumption of 
efficient vehicles (e.g., improving 16MPG to 20MPG saves more than improving 34MPG 
to 50MPG) when the same information about vehicle fuel consumption is framed in 
gallons per 100 miles (GPM) rather than in MPG (Larrick & Soll, 2008). Both novices 
and trained experts benefit from the implementation of simple visual representations of 
risk information, whether they are evaluating medical treatments or new counterterrorism 
techniques (Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, 2011; 2013). Moreover, statistical analyses of 
voting patterns in the 2000 United States Presidential Election suggest that had the 
butterfly ballots used by Palm Beach County, Florida been designed in a manner not 
inconsistent with basic principles of perception, Al Gore would have been elected 
President (Fox & Sitkin, 2015).  
Even when people fully understand their options, if one option is better for them 
or society but choosing it requires effort, expertise, or self-control, its selection can be 
increased if small nudges in presentation and elicitation methods are implemented 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Nudges take many forms such as information framing, 
commitment devices, and default selection. Voters are more mobilized by message 
frames that emphasize a high expected turnout at the polls (implying voting is normative) 
than message frames that emphasize low expected turnouts (implying each vote is 
important; Gerber & Rogers, 2009), and consumers prefer lower-fat meat when its fat 
content is framed as 25% fat than 75% lean (Levin & Gaeth, 1988). Shoppers are willing 
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to commit to foregoing cash rebates that they currently receive on healthy foods if they 
fail to increase the amount of healthy food that they purchase by 5% (Schwartz et al., 
2014), and employees substantially increase their contributions to 401k programs when 
they commit to allocating money from future raises to their retirement savings before 
receiving those raises (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004).     
People are more likely to choose an option if it is a default from which they must 
opt-out than if it is an option that they must actively choose (i.e., “opt-in”). In one study, 
university employees were 36% more likely to receive a flu shot if emailed an 
appointment from which they could opt-out, than if emailed a link from which they could 
schedule an appointment (Chapman, Li, Colby, & Yoon, 2010). Organ donation rates are 
at least 58% higher in European countries in which the default is to opt-out of being a 
donor than in which the default is to opt-in (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). Selecting better 
default options is not necessarily coercive. It results in outcomes that decision makers 
themselves prefer (Goldstein, Johnson, Herrman, & Heitmann, 2008; Huh, Vosgerau, & 
Morewedge, 2014). 
The potential applications of optimizing of choice architecture are broad, ranging 
from increasing retirement savings and preserving privacy, to reducing the gasoline, soda, 
and junk food that people consume (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015; 
Larrick & Soll, 2008; Schwartz et al., 2014; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). Optimizing choice 
architecture is a cheap way to improve public welfare while preserving freedom of 
choice, as it does not exclude options or change economic incentives (Camerer, 
Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003; 2008). 
Critics, however, point out that these improvements may not do enough. They tend to 
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reduce decision bias in one, not multiple contexts, and do not address the underlying 
structural causes of biased decisions such as poorly calibrated incentives or bad options 
(Bhargava & Loewenstein, 2015).  
 
TRAINING 
Training interventions to improve decision making, to date, have met with limited 
success mostly in specific domains. Training can be very effective when accuracy 
requires experts to recognize patterns and select an appropriate response, such as in 
weather forecasting, firefighting, and chess (Phillips, Klein, & Siek, 2004). By contrast, 
even highly trained professionals are less accurate than very simple mathematical models 
in other domains such as parole decisions, personnel evaluations, and clinical 
psychological testing (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989). Whether domain-specific expertise 
is achievable appears to be contingent on external factors such as the prevalence of clear 
feedback, the frequency of the outcome being judged, and the number and nature of 
variables that determine that outcome (Kohler, Brenner, & Griffin, 2002; Harvey, 2011).  
Evidence that training effectively improves general decision making ability is 
inconclusive at present (Arkes, 1991; Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009; Phillips et 
al., 2004). Weather forecasters are well calibrated when predicting the chance of 
precipitation (Murphy & Winkler, 1974), for example, but are overconfident in their 
answers to general knowledge questions (Wagenaar & Keren, 1986). Even within their 
domain of expertise, experts struggle to apply their training to new problems. 
Philosophers trained in logic exhibit the same preference reversals in similar moral 
dilemmas as academics without logic training (Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012), and 
Debiasing Decisions 10 
physicians exhibit the same preference reversals as untrained patients for equivalent 
medical treatments when those treatments are framed in terms of survival or mortality 
rates (McNeil, Paulker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982). Several studies have shown that people 
do not apply their training to unfamiliar and dissimilar domains because they lack the 
necessary metacognitive strategies to recognize underlying problem structure (for 
reviews, see Barnett & Ceci, 2002; Reeves & Weisberg, 1994; Willingham, 2008). 
Debiasing training methods teaching inferential rules (e.g., “consider-the-
opposite” and “consider-an-alternative” strategies) that are grounded in two-system 
models of reasoning hold some promise (e.g., Lilenfield et al., 2009; Milkman, Chugh, & 
Bazerman, 2009; Soll, Milkman, & Payne, in press). Two-system models of reasoning 
assume that people initially make an automatic intuitive judgment that can be 
subsequently accepted, corrected, or replaced by more controlled and effortful thinking: 
through “System 1” and “System 2” processes, respectively (Evans, 2003; Morewedge & 
Kahneman, 2010; Sloman, 1996). Recognizing that “1593 x 1777” is a math problem and 
that its answer is a large number, for instance, are automatic outputs of System 1 
processes. Deducing the answer to the problem requires the engagement of effortful 
System 2 processes.  
Effective debiasing training typically encourages the consideration of information 
that is likely to be underweighted in intuitive judgment (e.g., Hirt & Markman, 1995), or 
teaches people statistical reasoning and normative rules of which they may be unaware 
(e.g., Larrick, Morgan, & Nisbett, 1990). In large doses, debiasing training can be 
effective. Coursework in statistical reasoning, and graduate training in probabilistic 
sciences such as psychology and medicine, does appear to increase the use of statistics 
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and logic when reasoning about everyday problems to which they apply (Nisbett et al., 
1987).  
 
PERSISTENT DEBIASING WITH A SINGLE INTERVENTION  
We tested whether a single debiasing training intervention could effectively 
produce immediate and persistent improvements in decision making. In two experiments, 
we directly compared the efficacy of two debiasing training interventions, a video and an 
interactive serious (i.e., educational) computer game. Videos and games are scalable 
training methods that can be used for efficient teaching of cognitive skills (e.g., Downs, 
2014; Haferkamp, Kraemer, Linehan, & Schembri, 2011; Sliney & Murphy, 2008). The 
experiments, funded by Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity BAA-11-03, 
tested whether debiasing training could produce persistent reductions in six cognitive 
biases identified by our program sponsor as affecting all types of intelligence analysis. 
Experiment 1 targeted three cognitive biases: bias blind spot (i.e., perceiving 
oneself to be less biased than one’s peers; Scopelliti et al., 2015), confirmation bias (i.e., 
gathering and interpreting evidence in a manner confirming rather than disconfirming the 
hypothesis being tested; Nickerson, 1998), and fundamental attribution error (i.e., 
attributing the behavior of a person to dispositional rather than to situational influences; 
Gilbert, 1998; Jones & Harris, 1967). Experiment 2 targeted three different cognitive 
biases: anchoring (i.e., overweighting the first information primed or considered in 
subsequent judgment; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), bias induced by over-reliance on 
representativeness (i.e., using the similarity of an outcome to a prototypical outcome to 
judge its probability; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), and social projection (i.e., assuming 
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others’ emotions, thoughts, and values are similar to one’s own; Epley, Morewedge, & 
Keysar, 2004; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). 
Many tasks crucial to intelligence analysis are influenced by these biases (for a 
review, see Heuer, 1999). Analysts must assess evidence with uncertain truth value (e.g., 
anchoring, bias blind spot, confirmation bias). They must infer cause and effect when 
evaluating past, present, and future events (e.g., confirmation bias, representativeness), 
the behavior of persons, and the actions of nations (e.g., fundamental attribution error, 
projection). Analysts regularly estimate probabilities (e.g., anchoring, confirmation bias, 
projection bias, representativeness), evaluate their own analyses, and evaluate the 
analyses of others (e.g., anchoring, bias blind spot, confirmation bias, projection bias). 
Although each of these cognitive biases may have its unique influence, multiple biases 
are likely to act in concert in any complex assessment (Cooper, 2005).   
Attempting to reduce these biases with videos and games allowed us to administer 
short, one-shot training interventions (i.e., approximately 30 and 60 minutes, 
respectively) using two different mixes of the four debiasing training procedures 
proposed by Fischhoff (1982): (1) teaching people about each bias, (2) teaching people 
the directional influence of each bias on judgment, (3) providing feedback, and (4) 
providing extended feedback with coaching, intervention, and mitigating strategies. The 
videos incorporated debiasing training procedures 1, 2, and mitigating strategies (i.e., 4 
without feedback, intervention, or coaching) in a passive format. The games incorporated 
all four debiasing training procedures in an interactive format. Each participant watched 
one video or played one game, without repetition. 
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Each video instructed viewers about three cognitive biases, gave examples of each 
bias, and provided mitigating strategies (e.g., consider alternative explanations, anchors, 
possible outcomes, perspectives, base-rates, countervailing evidence, and potential 
situational influences on behavior). Each of the interactive computer games elicited the 
same three cognitive biases during gameplay by asking players to make in-game 
decisions based on limited evidence (e.g., testing a hypothesis, evaluating the behavior of 
a character in the game, etc.). In an after-action review (AAR) at the end of each of three 
levels of each game, players were given definitions and examples of the three biases, 
personalized feedback on the degree to which they exhibited each bias, and mitigating 
strategies and practice. Like the video, the mitigating strategies taught in the game 
included: consider alternative explanations, anchors, possible outcomes, perspectives, 
base-rates, countervailing evidence, and consider potential situational influences on 
behavior. In addition, the games taught formal rules of logic (e.g., the conjunction of two 
events can be no more likely than either event on its own), methods of hypothesis testing 
(e.g., hold all variables other than the suspected causal variable constant when testing a 
hypothesis), and relevant statistical rules (e.g., large samples are more accurate 
representations than small samples), as well as encouraging participants to carefully 
reconsider their initial answers. 
Our experiments tested the immediate and persistent effects of the debiasing 
interventions by measuring the extent to which participants committed each bias three 
times: in a pretest before training, in a posttest immediately after training, and in follow-
up testing 8 or 12 weeks after training (see Figure 1). The pretest, training, and posttest 
were conducted in our laboratory and measured immediate debiasing effects of the 
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training interventions. The follow-up was administered online and measured the 
persistent debiasing effects of the training interventions over a longer term. Sample sizes 
were declared in advance to our government sponsor, and independent third-party 
analyses of the data were performed that confirmed the accuracy of our results (Kopecky, 
McKneely, & Bos, 2015). 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: BIAS BLIND SPOT, CONFIRMATION BIAS, AND 
FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTION ERROR 
Method 
Participants 
 Two hundred and seventy-eight people in a convenience sample recruited in 
Pittsburgh, PA (132 women; Mage = 24.5, SD = 8.52) received $30 for completing a 
laboratory training session, and an additional $30 payment for completing a follow-up 
test online. Most (80.2%) participants had some college education, 14.3% had graduate or 
professional degrees. A total of 243 participants successfully completed the laboratory 
portion of the experiment (Game n = 160; Video n = 83); 196 successfully completed the 
online follow-up (Game n = 130; Video n = 66).2 
 
Training Interventions 
Video. Unbiasing Your Biases is a 30-minute unclassified training video 
(produced by Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, 2012). A narrator first 
defines heuristics and explains how heuristics can sometimes lead to incorrect inferences. 
He then defines bias blind spot, confirmation bias, and fundamental attribution error, 
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presents vignettes in which actors commit each bias, gives an additional example of 
fundamental attribution error and confirmation bias, and suggests mitigating strategies. 
The last two minutes of the video is a comprehensive review of its content.  
Game. Missing: The Pursuit of Terry Hughes is a computer game designed to 
elicit and mitigate bias blind spot, confirmation bias, and fundamental attribution error 
(produced by Symborski, Barton, Quinn, Morewedge, Kassam, & Korris, 2014). It is a 
first person point-of-view educational game, in which the player searches for a missing 
neighbor (i.e., Terry Hughes) and exonerates her of criminal activity. During interactive 
gameplay in each of three levels, players make judgments designed to test the degree to 
which they exhibit confirmation bias and the fundamental attribution error. After-action 
reviews at the end of each level feature experts explaining each bias and narrative 
examples. To elicit bias blind spot, players then assess their degree of bias during each 
level. Next, participants are given personalized feedback on the degree of bias they 
exhibited. Finally, participants perform additional practice judgments of confirmation 




We developed measures of the extent to which participants committed each of the 
three cognitive biases: a Bias Blind Spot scale (BBS), a Fundamental Attribution Error 
scale (FAE), and six Confirmation Bias scales (CB). These were tested to ensure 
reliability and validity (see Supplemental Materials). Three interchangeable version of 
each scale (i.e., subscales) were created to measure bias commission at pretest, posttest, 
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and follow-up. Scoring of each subscale ranged from 0 (no biased answers) to 100 (all 
answers biased). Confirmation bias scale scores were calculated by averaging the six CB 
scales at pretest, posttest, and follow-up. Overall bias commission scores at pretest, 
posttest, and follow-up were calculated by averaging the three bias subscale scores at that 
time point (i.e., BBS, FAE, CB).  
Ancillary scales measuring bias knowledge were developed to assess changes in 
ability to recognize instances of the three biases and discriminate between them. Bias 
knowledge scales were scored on a 0-100 scale, with higher scores indicating greater 
ability to recognize and discriminate between the three biases.   
 
Testing Procedure 
 In a laboratory session, each participant was seated in a private cubicle with a 
computer. Participants first completed the pretest measure, consisting of three subscales 
assessing their commission of each of the three cognitive biases (i.e., BBS, CB, and 
FAE). Participants also completed a bias knowledge scale at this time. Next, each 
participant was randomly assigned to receive one of the training interventions, to either 
play the game or watch the video, without repetition. Immediately after training, 
participants completed the posttest measure, consisting of three subscales assessing their 
commission of each of the three cognitive biases post-training (i.e., BBS, CB, and FAE). 
Participants also completed a bias knowledge posttest at this time. To measure the 
persistence of debiasing training, eight weeks from the day in which he or she completed 
the laboratory session, each participant received a personalized link via email to complete 
the follow-up measure, consisting of three subscales assessing his or her commission of 
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each of the three biases (i.e., BBS, CB, and FAE). He or she had seven days to complete 
the follow-up measure in one sitting. Participants also completed a bias knowledge 
measure at this time. The specific bias scales serving as the pretest, posttest, and follow-
up measures of bias commission and bias knowledge were counterbalanced across 
participants.           
 
Results 
Scale Reliability  
Subscales were reliable. Bias blind spot (Cronbach’s ): .77pretest, .82 posttest, and 
.76follow-up. Confirmation bias: .73pretest, .73 posttest, and .76follow-up. FAE: .68pretest, .77 posttest, 
and .78follow-up.  
Bias Commission 
Main effects of training on bias commission overall and for each of the three 
cognitive biases were analyzed using 2 (training: game vs. video) x 2 (timing: pretest vs. 
posttest or pretest vs. follow-up) mixed ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last 
factor. To compare the efficacy of the game and video, between subjects (training: game 
vs. video) ANCOVAs were performed to compare the debiasing effects of the training 
methods at posttest and follow-up, controlling for pretest scores. Means of bias 
commission scores for overall bias and each of the three biases by training intervention 
conditions are presented in Figure 2 (bias knowledge scores are only reported in the text).  
Overall bias. Overall, training effectively reduced cognitive bias immediately and 
two months later, F(1, 241) = 439.23, p < .001 and F(1, 194) = 179.88, p < .001, 
respectively. Debiasing effect sizes (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991) for overall bias were 
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large for the game (dpre-post = 1.68 and dpre-followup = 1.11) and medium for the video (dpre-
post = .69 and dpre-followup = .66). The game more effectively debiased participants than did 
the video immediately and two months later, F(1, 240) = 68.8, p < .001 and F(1, 193) = 
12.69, p < .001, respectively.  
Bias blind spot. Training effectively reduced BBS immediately and two months 
later, F(1, 241) = 151.66, p < .001 and F(1, 194) = 104.51, p < .001, respectively. 
Debiasing effect sizes for BBS were large for the game (dpre-post = .98 and dpre-followup = 
.89) and medium for the video (dpre-post = .49 and dpre-followup = .49). The game more 
effectively debiased participants than did the video immediately and two months later, 
F(1, 240) = 17.31, p < .001 and F(1, 193) = 13.18, p < .001, respectively. 
Fundamental attribution error. Training effectively reduced FAE immediately 
and two months later, F(1, 241) = 183.74, p < .001 and F(1, 194) = 85.32, p < .001, 
respectively. Debiasing effect sizes for FAE were large and medium for the game (dpre-post 
= 1.12 and dpre-followup = .72) and medium and small for the video (dpre-post = .38 and dpre-
followup = .52). The game more effectively debiased participants than did the video 
immediately and two months later, F(1, 240) = 50.06, p < .001 and F(1, 193) = 6.53, p < 
.05, respectively. 
Confirmation bias. Training effectively reduced confirmation bias immediately 
and two months later, F(1, 241) = 181.08, p < .001 and F(1, 194) = 45.52, p < .001, 
respectively. Debiasing effect sizes for confirmation bias were large to medium the game 
(dpre-post = 1.09 and dpre-followup = .58) and medium to small for the video (dpre-post = .38 and 
dpre-followup = .26). The game more effectively debiased participants than did the video 
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immediately and two months later, F(1, 240) = 33.54, p < .001 and F(1, 193) = 5.17, p < 
.05, respectively. 
Our scales tested six different facets of confirmation bias, but our game only 
taught three. This testing structure allowed us to test the generalization of debiasing 
training across trained (Snyder & Swann, 1978; Tschirgi, 1980; Wason, 1960) and 
untrained facets of confirmation bias (Downs & Shafir, 1999; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; 
Wason, 1968). Compared to their pretest scores, participants exhibited a reduction in 
confirmation bias on the trained facets at posttest and follow-up, t(159) = 9.81, p < .001, 
d = .78 and t(129) = 2.69, p < .01, d = .24, respectively. More important, compared to 
their pretest scores, participants exhibited reduced confirmation bias for untrained facets 
at posttest and follow-up, t(159) = 10.05, p < .001, d = .79 and t(129) = 7.42, p < .001, d 
= .65, respectively. Controlling for their pretest scores, participants performed better on 
trained than untrained facets of confirmation bias at posttest, t(159) = 2.56, p < .05, d = 
.20, but there were no significant differences between trained and untrained facets at 
follow-up, t < 1 (for means, see Figure 3). 
Bias Knowledge 
 Training also effectively improved bias knowledge immediately and two months 
later, F(1, 241) = 385.13, p < .001 and F(1, 194) = 64.31, p < .001, respectively. Bias 
knowledge increased for participants who played the game (Mpretest = 35.78, Mposttest = 
58.54, Mfollow-up = 47.98, dpre-post = 1.05 and dpre-followup = .52) and watched the video 
(Mpretest = 35.29, Mposttest = 69.28, Mfollowup = 50.63, dpre-post = 1.69 and dpre-follow-up = .69). 
The video more effectively taught participants to recognize and discriminate bias than did 
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the game immediately, F(1, 240) = 15.52, p < .001, but was no more effective two 
months later, F < 1. 
 




Two hundred and sixty-nine people in a convenience sample recruited in 
Pittsburgh, PA (155 women; Mage = 27.8, SD = 12.01) received $30 for completing a 
laboratory training session, and an additional $30 payment for completing a follow-up 
test online. Most (94.1%) participants had some college education, 19.3% had graduate or 
professional degrees. A total of 238 participants successfully completed the laboratory 
portion of the experiment (Game n = 156; Video n = 82); 192 successfully completed the 
online follow-up (Game n = 126; Video n = 66).2 
Stimuli 
Training video. Unbiasing Your Biases 2 (Intelligence Advanced Research 
Projects Activity, 2013) had the same structure as the video in Experiment 1, but 
addressed anchoring, projection, and representativeness.     
Computer Game. Missing: The Final Secret is a serious game designed to elicit 
and mitigate to anchoring, projection, and representativeness. The game followed a 
narrative arc, genre, and structure similar to the game in Experiment 1 (see Barton, 
Symborski, Quinn, Morewedge, Kassam, & Korris, 2015). Players exonerate their 
employer of a criminal charge and uncover the criminal activity of her accusers, while 
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making decisions testing their commission of each of the cognitive biases during game 
play. Experiment 2 introduced adaptive training in the AARs. When players gave biased 
answers to practice questions, they received additional practice questions (up to 16 in 
total) and feedback.1 
 
Scale Development 
Scales measuring commission of anchoring, projection, and representativeness, 
and scales measuring bias knowledge were developed and scored following a procedure 
similar to that used in Experiment 1 (see Supplemental Materials).  
 
Testing Procedure 
 The experiment adhered to the same testing procedure as described in Experiment 
1, with the exception that the follow-up was administered 12 weeks after participants 
completed their laboratory session.  
 
Results 
Scale Reliability  
Subscales were reliable: Anchoring (Cronbach’s α): .60pretest, .52 posttest, and 
.62follow-up. Projection bias: .63pretest, .78 posttest, and .77follow-up. Representativeness: .86pretest, 
.87 posttest, and .93follow-up. 
Bias Commission  
The same analyses were performed as in Experiment 1. All bias commission scale 
means are presented in Figure 2. 
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Overall Bias. Overall, training effectively reduced cognitive bias immediately and 
three months later, F(1, 236) = 719.58, p < .001 and F(1, 190) = 246.17, p < .001, 
respectively. Debiasing effect sizes for overall bias were large for both the game (dpre-post 
= 1.74 and dpre-followup = 1.16) and video (dpre-post = 1.75 and dpre-followup = 1.07). However, 
the game more effectively debiased participants than did the video immediately, F(1, 
235) = 13.44, p < .001, and marginally three months later, F(1, 189) = 3.66, p = .057.  
Anchoring. Training effectively reduced anchoring immediately and three months 
later, F(1, 236) = 127.94, p < .001 and F(1, 190) = 78.42, p<.001, respectively. Debiasing 
effect sizes for anchoring were medium for the game (dpre-post = .70 and dpre-followup= .63) 
and large to medium for the video (dpre-post =.80 and dpre-followup = .66). The game and video 
were equally effective immediately and three months later, Fs < 1, ps > .62. 
Projection. Training effectively reduced projection immediately and three months 
later, F(1, 236) = 197.29, p < .001 and F(1, 190) = 34.52, p < .001, respectively. 
Debiasing effect sizes for projection were large to medium for the game (dpre-post = 1.11 
and dpre-followup= .54) and medium to small for the video (dpre-post = .49 and dpre-followup = 
.14). The game more effectively debiased participants than did the video immediately and 
three months later, F(1, 235) = 34.42, p < .001 and F(1, 189) = 13.49, p < .001, 
respectively. 
Representativeness. Training effectively reduced bias due to overreliance on 
representativeness immediately and three months later, F(1, 236) = 599.55, p < .001 and 
F(1, 190) = 216.36, p < .001, respectively. Debiasing effect sizes for representativeness 
were large for both the game (dpre-post = 1.51 and dpre-followup= 1.05) and video (dpre-post = 
1.80 and dpre-followup = 1.09). The game more effectively debiased participants than did the 
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video immediately, F(1, 235) = 10.85, p < .01, but was no more effective three months 
later, F < 1, p = .37. 
Bias Knowledge 
 Training effectively improved bias knowledge immediately and three months 
later, F(1, 236) = 506.52, p < .001 and F(1, 190) = 216.36,  p < .001, respectively. Bias 
knowledge increased for participants who played the game (Mpretest = 35.89, Mposttest = 
63.16, Mfollow-up = 50.65, dpre-post = .1.42 and dpre-followup = 1.05) and watched the video 
(Mpretest = 39.03, Mposttest = 74.11, Mfollow-up = 52.04, dpre-post = 1.53 and dpre-follow-up = 1.09). 
The video more effectively taught participants to recognize and discriminate bias than did 
the game immediately, F(1, 235) = 11.07, p < .001, but was no more effective three 
months later, F < 1. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
People generally intend to make good decisions, which are in their own and 
society’s best interest, but biases in judgment and decision making often lead them to 
make costly errors. More than 40 years of judgment and decision making research 
suggests feasible interventions to debias and improve decision making (Bhargava & 
Loewenstein, 2015; Fischhoff, 1982; Fox & Sitkin, 2015; Soll et al., in press). This 
research and its methods can be used to align incentives, present information, elicit 
choices, and educate people so they are able to make decisions in their best interest. 
Debiasing interventions are not, by default, coercive. Decisions always have some 
underlying structure that may bias the process or the outcome. Presenting information in 
a manner in which options are easier to evaluate generally improves choices by making 
people better able to evaluate those options along the dimensions that are important to 
Debiasing Decisions 24 
them. Commuting ranks among the most unpleasant daily experiences (Kahneman, 
Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004), for instance, but people are relatively 
insensitive to the duration of a prospective commute unless they are provided with a 
familiar comparison standard (Morewedge, Kassam, Hsee, & Caruso, 2009). For some 
decisions such as whether to be an organ donor, one option must be specified as the 
default even if one defers the decision. Selecting a default option that is beneficial for the 
decision maker or society can improve the public good while preserving freedom of 
choice (Camerer et al., 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003; 2008). Furthermore, people 
actively seek out many kinds of debiasing interventions such as timesaving 
recommendation systems (Goldstein et al., 2008) and commitment devices to give them 
the willpower to make choices that are unappealing in the present but will benefit them 
more in the future (e.g., Thaler & Benartzi, 2004; Schwarz et al., 2014).     
Debiasing interventions are not, by default, more costly than the status quo. New 
incentives do not have to impose a financial cost to taxpayers or decision makers. Social 
influence is an underutilized but powerful nonpecuniary motive for positive behavior 
change, for instance, that can produce significant reductions in environmental waste and 
energy consumption (Cialdini, 2003; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 
2007). Moreover, existing incentives are only effective if they motivate behavior as they 
were intended. If incentives are misaligned, misinterpreted, or poorly framed, they may 
be costly and ineffective or counterproductive. 
Small changes in message framing and choice elicitation can produce debiasing 
effects for little additional cost. In two laboratory studies, simply framing an economic 
stimulus as a “bonus” rather than a “rebate” more than doubled how much of that 
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stimulus was spent (Epley, Mak, & Idson, 2006). In a field study run in the United 
Kingdom, adding a single sentence to late tax notices that truthfully stated the majority of 
UK citizens pay their taxes on time increased the clearance rate of late payers to 86% 
(£560 million out of £650 million owed), compared to a clearance rate of 57% the 
previous year (£290 million out of £510 million owed; Cialdini, Martin, & Goldstein, 
2015). 
Training interventions have an upfront production cost, but the marginal financial 
and temporal costs of training many additional people are minimal. The results of our 
experiments suggest that even a single training intervention, such as the games and 
videos we tested in this article, can have significant debiasing effects that persist across a 
variety of contexts affected by the same bias. Participants who played our games 
exhibited large reductions in cognitive bias immediately (-46.25% and -31.94%), which 
persisted at least 2 or 3 months later (-34.76% and -23.57%) in Experiments 1 and 2, 
respectively. Participants who watched the videos exhibited medium and large reductions 
immediately (-18.60% and -25.70%), which persisted at least 2 or 3 months later (-
20.10% and -19.20%) in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. The greater efficacy of the 
games than the videos suggest that personal feedback and practice increase the debiasing 
effects of training, but more research is needed to determine precisely why it was more 
effective. Most important, these results suggest that despite its rocky start (Fischhoff, 
1982), training is a promising avenue through which to develop future debiasing 
interventions. 
Decision research is in an exciting phase of expansion, increasing the basic 
research that identifies and elucidates biases while extending its reach by developing and 
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testing new practical interventions. Laboratory experiments provide a safe and 
inexpensive microcosm in which to uncover new biases, develop new theories, and test 
new interventions. Many are now testing successful laboratory interventions and their 
extensions in larger field experiments, such as randomized controlled trials, to determine 
which biases and interventions are most influential in particular contexts (Haynes, 
Service, Goldacre, & Torgerson, 2012). This work extends outside the ivory tower. 
Researchers have produced numerous successful collaborations with government and 
industry partners that have reduced waste and improved the health and finances of the 
public (e.g., Chapman et al., 2010; Mellers et al., 2014; Schultz et al., 2007; Schwartz et 
al., 2014; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). Ad hoc collaborations and targeted programs, such 
as the development and testing of training inventions that we report, have been very 
successful (see also Mellers et al., 2014). Several countries have even established panels 
of behavioral scientists to develop interventions from within government, such the Social 
and Behavioral Sciences Team in the United States. Decision making is pervasive in 
professional and everyday life. Its study and improvement can contribute much to the 
public good.  
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Figure 1. Immediate debiasing effects of training interventions (a game or video) were measured by comparing pretest and posttest 
scores of bias commission in a laboratory session. Long term debiasing effects of training interventions were measured in an online 
follow-up measuring bias commission 8 or 12 weeks later (Experiments 1 and 2, respectively).    
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Figure 2. Bias commission by training intervention in Experiments 1 and 2. Left and right 
columns illustrate the mitigating effects of training on bias commission overall and for 
each of the three cognitive biases in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Scales range from 
0-100; higher scores indicate more biased answers (95% CI). Both training interventions 
effectively debiased participants. Overall, the game more effectively debiased 
participants than did the video in Experiments 1 and 2. Symbols indicate statistically 
significant and marginally significant differences between game and video conditions at 
posttest and follow-up: † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; and ***p < .001.  
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Figure 3. Debiasing effects of the game were observed for both trained and untrained 
facets of confirmation bias in Experiment 1, suggesting that debiasing effects of training 
generalized across domains. Scales range from 0-100, higher scores indicate more bias 
(95% CI). Asterisk indicates significant difference between trained and untrained facets 
of confirmation bias at posttest, controlling for pretest scores, * p < .05. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. There were four variants of the Experiment 1 game, including whether a game 
score or narrative examples were included or excluded in the AARs. Moreover, 
half of participants in the game condition played the full game, and half played 
only the first round. We did not observe a significant difference across these game 
and methodological variations in their reduction of overall bias at posttest and 
follow-up, Fs ≤ 2.29, ps ≥ .13. In Experiment 2, all players completed the whole 
game, but there were four variants including whether hints or game scores were 
provided. We did not observe a significant difference across these variants in their 
reduction of overall bias at posttest and follow-up, all ts ≤ 1.77, ps ≥ .08. In both 
experiments, we report the results collapsed across these variations.    
2. Participants were excluded before analyses in Experiment 1 because they played 
early game prototypes (n = 20), experienced game crashes (n = 3) and server 
errors during scale administration (n = 6), or were unable to finish the laboratory 
session in 4 hours (n = 6). In addition, those who did not complete the follow-up 
test within 7 days of receiving notification were not included in follow-up 
analyses (n = 47). Participants were excluded before analyses in Experiment 2 
because of game crashes (n = 1), experimenter or participant error (n = 3), or 
failed attention checks (n = 27). In addition, those who did not complete the 
follow-up within 7 days of receiving notification were not included in follow-up 
analyses (n = 45).  
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: SCALE DEVELOPMENT 
For each bias, we conducted a literature review to identify canonical questions, 
paradigms, and generated similar additional items (approximately 200 in total). BBS 
questions were developed following the question format of Scopelliti and colleagues 
(2015). FAE questions were based on the attitude attribution, quizmaster, silent 
interview, and moral attribution paradigms (Gawronski, 2004). CB questions were 
developed based on six paradigms: Wason’s (1960) card selection task, Wason’s (1968) 
triplets task; Tschirgi’s (1980) cause identification paradigm, Snyder and Swann’s (1978) 
trait hypothesis testing paradigm, an enriched versus impoverished profiles choice 
paradigm (Downs & Shafir, 1999), and a judgment of covariation paradigm (Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980). Three interchangeable versions (i.e., subscales) were created for each scale, 
so that each participant would see different questions at pretest (before training), posttest 
(immediately after training), and follow-up (8 weeks after training).   
One sample of 288 Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers answered all FAE 
and BBS items. A separate sample of 310 AMT workers answered all CB items. We 
performed scale purification using an iterative procedure. In order to ensure that three 
valid and interchangeable versions of each scale were developed, questions with low 
item-total correlations were removed until random sampling suggested that a subsample 
of one third of the items on each bias scale would achieve a minimum of α ≥.7 reliability 
at least 95% of the time. This purification resulted in a 27-item BBS scale, a 45-item FAE 
scale, two 9-item scales based on Wason (1960, 1968), a 12-item scale based on Tschirgi 
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(1980), and three 18-item scales based on Snyder and Swann (1978), Downs and Shafir 
(1999), and Nisbett and Ross (1980). Exploratory factor analyses of the purified scales 
indicated a unidimensional structure for each scale, with average variance explained = 
36%. All items correlated positively with their respective factor, with an average 
minimum r = .41.  
Seven to 11 days after completing the full scales, 305 participants completed 
purified versions of the same scales. Responses indicated high test-retest reliability and 
stability over time, Mr = .79. We divided each scale into three interchangeable subscales 
by iteratively selecting the three items with the highest average correlations and placing 
them into separate subscales, all subscale α’s ≥ .65. Items were divided among subscales 
so that subscales were maximally similar.  
Item scoring logic varied due to their different formats. All item scores varied 
between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating greater bias (i.e., choosing confirming answers, 
making dispositional attributions, indicating less susceptibility to bias than one’s peers). 
We calculated subscale scores by summing all individual items (i.e., all BBS items, FAE 
items, or CB items) and transforming totals into a score ranging from 0 (no biased 
answers) to 100 (all answers biased). 
Bias knowledge questions had two forms. Recognition questions described an 
instance in which one of the three biases was committed and required participants to 
identify the bias in a free recall format. Discrimination questions described an instance of 
bias and tested its identification in a multiple-choice format. The final questionnaires 
contained 24 questions with satisfactory face validity (12 for recognition and 12 for 
discrimination), equally divided among the three biases. 
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EXPERIMENT 2: SCALE DEVELOPMENT 
Three interchangeable subscales were created for each scale, so that each 
participant would see different questions at pretest (before training), posttest 
(immediately after training), and follow-up (8 weeks after training). For each bias, we 
conducted a literature review to identify canonical questions, paradigms, and generated 
similar additional items (423 in total). Anchoring questions used self-generated or 
experimenter provided anchors that were relevant or irrelevant (Strack & Mussweiler, 
1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Simmons, Nelson, & LeBoeuf, 2010). Projection 
questions were developed from three bias facets: the false consensus effect (Ross, 
Greene, & House, 1976), attributive similarity (Holmes, 1968; Kreuger & Stanke, 2001), 
and the curse of knowledge (Birch & Bloom, 2007). The curse of knowledge dimension 
was not included in the final instrument based on factor analyses suggesting its exclusion. 
Representativeness questions were based on conjunction fallacy, base rate neglect, 
gambler’s fallacy, perceptions of random sequences, and sample size neglect paradigms 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
After an initial purification stage, three samples of AMT workers (N = 624) 
completed the scales. Purification resulted in a 54-item anchoring scale, a 69-item 
projection scale, and a 78-item representativeness scale. Questions were then split into 
three interchangeable subscales for each bias. All the subset scales had acceptable 
internal consistency, Mα = .68, and test re-test reliability, Mr = .61. Item and subscale 
scoring logic followed the procedure used in Experiment 1. 
All bias knowledge questions for Experiment 2 were multiple choice 
discrimination questions. The final questionnaire contained 21 questions with satisfactory 
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face validity, divided into subscales with 7 questions each. Knowledge scales were scored 
on a 0-100 scale with higher scores indicating greater knowledge. ! !
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